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Abstract
The buildup in government debt in response to the “great reces-
sion,” has raised a number of policy dilemmas for individual coun-
tries as well as the world as a whole. The recent need for a
change of fiscal policy stance has fuelled debates about the impact
of fiscal consolidation on domestic economies that are tightening,
the flow-on effects to the world economy, and also about how
much tightening there should be and how quickly it should hap-
pen. This paper explores these issues in a global framework focus-
ing on the national and global consequences of coordinated fiscal
consolidation. It explores the implications this fiscal adjustment
might have on country risk premia and what happens if all coun-
tries coordinate their fiscal adjustment except the United States.
A coordinated fiscal consolidation in the industrial world that
is not accompanied by U.S. actions is likely to lead to a substan-
tial worsening of trade imbalances globally as the release of capital
in fiscally contracting economies flows into the U.S. economy, ap-
preciates the U.S. dollar, and worsens the current account position
of the United States. The scale of this change is likely to be suf-
ficient to substantially increase the probability of a trade war be-
tween the United States and other economies. To avoid this out-
come, a coordinated fiscal adjustment is clearly in the interest of
the global economy.
1. Introduction
The global ªnancial crisis, which began with the bursting
of the U.S. housing market bubble in late 2007 and culmi-
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nated with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, led to a deep global recession.
Governments responded with revised monetary and ªscal policies that continue to-
day. Many countries have ofªcial interest rates close to zero and governments are
still stimulating their economies through discretionary ªscal spending well in excess
of receipts. The ªscal position of many economies has rapidly deteriorated due to
lower tax revenues resulting from the economic slowdown, more autonomous
spending with higher levels of unemployment, and the large extra discretionary
spending from ªscal stimulus packages in the aftermath of the global ªnancial crisis.
The consequence for many has been a large run-up in government debt, as shown in
Figure 1. Debt itself is not a problem if the spending increases or tax cuts that under-
lie the increase in debt yield high rates of return that enable the debt to be serviced.
The problem with large government debt, particularly during a crisis, is that it is not
clear which investments will yield the government a sufªcient rate of return to ser-
vice these debts.
The particular source of government debt expansion varies across countries. For
some countries, a well-known example being Greece, the deterioration in ªscal
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Figure 1. Government debt in OECD economies
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 88 Database (November 2010).
Notes: 1. This includes cumulated deªcit for 2008–12, debt-increasing equity participations in companies and the impact of GDP growth.
2. Cumulated deªcits correspond to mainland only.
position as a result of the global ªnancial crisis came on the back of high levels of
government debt that were already a cause for concern. Before the crisis, Greece had
a level of debt to GDP of around 100 percent. Two years after the crisis, Greece’s
debt had ballooned to over 125 percent of GDP.1 It is expected to deteriorate further.
For Ireland, the level of debt to GDP was low at around 30 percent, but increased
dramatically when the Irish Government bailed out several large banks.
The deterioration in the ªscal position in key economies has been so large that
ªnancial markets have become unnerved. Risk premia on government bonds in
countries perceived to be risky have shot up. Continuing with the example of
Greece, yields on 10-year group bonds have been some 900 basis points above the
equivalent German bond rate (Figure 2). Financial markets have judged that some
economies are not likely to be able to service their debts and there is a probability
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1 This ªgure is based on a Maastricht criteria basis as computed by the OECD Economic Out-
look and considers the start of the global crisis to be 2008 when Lehman Brothers collapsed.
Figure 2. Ten-year bond yields in selected Euro Area economies (percent)
Source: IMF (2010), Figure 8, p. 25 (based on Datastream data).
they would default. That probability has been reºected in the higher risk premia
these countries have to pay on their borrowings.
Faced with higher interest bills on already high and growing levels of debt, many
governments have had little choice but to announce austerity packages. Although
the government ªscal stimulus was seen as necessary to restore conªdence to mar-
kets and stimulate deteriorating economies in the aftermath of the global ªnancial
crisis, by 2010 the massive ªscal stimulus programs and associated run-up in debt
had, for many economies, become a conªdence-sapping exercise. Fiscal austerity
programs have been announced in many countries and, while acknowledging the
delicate balance in promoting “growth friendly” consolidation plans, the G-20
group of countries also noted the “risk that the failure to implement consolidation
where necessary would undermine conªdence and hamper growth.”2
This change of ªscal policy stance has fueled another debate that has two related as-
pects. One is the impact of ªscal consolidation on economies that are tightening and
the ºow-on effects to the world economy. The other debate is how much tightening
there should be and how soon it should be implemented, and what those effects
might be. Many commentators argue that too much austerity now will simply drive
the world economy back into recession and potentially bring on another ªnancial
crisis because the health of bank balance sheets and that of households is not fully
restored. Yes, so the argument goes, ªscal austerity is needed at some stage—but,
because households and businesses are busily paying down debt, now is not the
time for premature tightening by governments.
This paper contributes to the ongoing debates relating to ªscal consolidation as fol-
lows. After presenting some background information in Section 2, we outline the
model underlying this study in Section 3. In Section 4 we explore the extent of ªscal
consolidation required in each country or region required to reach “more sustain-
able” levels. In Section 5 we explore three different scenarios for ªscal consolidation
and its implications. The ªrst scenario is a reduction in all countries such that gov-
ernment debt to GDP is stabilized at a maximum of 60 percent by 2020, focusing on
a case where the deªcits required to do this are undertaken over 10 years compared
to a case where the same amount of deªcit reduction is phased in over 15 years
(clearly, the debt-to-GDP ratio is different, but the deªcit reductions are comparable
to get a measure of the role of timing). The second scenario is the case of the 10-year
deªcit reduction, but this time it is assumed that country risk premia change in re-
sponse to the credible announcement of ªscal cuts. The third scenario is the case
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2 Reuters, Toronto 27 June 2010, Extracts from Communiqué.
where all countries with excessive debts cooperatively undertake ªscal contraction
except the United States, which continues to run large ªscal deªcits over the period
of interest. Section 6 provides a summary and conclusion.
2. Background
The debate about the domestic and international effects of ªscal consolidation is not
new. It was a topical debate in the United States during the 1990s given its quadru-
pling of public debt between 1980 and 1992. Deªcit reduction became a priority for
President Clinton’s administration. Back then, the administration was facing projec-
tions by the Congressional Budget Ofªce of deªcits of up to 6 percent of GDP by the
turn of the century.
At the same time, another major debate about ªscal consolidation was occurring in
Europe.3 Under the Maastricht Agreement, the European Economic Community (as
it was then called) proposed implementing a single currency in Europe by the end
of the 1990s. But, to be a participant in this monetary union, countries had to satisfy
four indicators of policy convergence. These macro indicators covered inºation,
interest rates, the movement of each currency within a narrow band, and the gen-
eral government deªcit should be no more than 3 percent of GDP and the ratio of
government debt to GDP must be approaching the benchmark of 60 percent of
GDP at a reasonable pace. This last criterion meant that some countries, notably
Italy, Belgium, Greece, and Portugal, needed to undertake signiªcant ªscal consoli-
dation to satisfy the criteria for ªscal convergence by 1997 at a time when they were
growing slowly.4
Some of these past issues were how best to undertake this ªscal consolidation: by
raising taxes or by cutting spending? And, if it was to be expenditure cuts, where
should they occur?5 Another set of issues surrounded the effects of the ªscal consoli-
dation on the domestic economy and the ºow-on effects to the world economy.
These ºow-on effects can be important in a globalized world of integrated trade and
ªnancial linkages. For example, McKibbin and Bagnoli (1993) showed that two cru-
cial aspects of ªscal consolidation are a reduction in real long-term interest rates
(which stimulates investment) and a depreciation of the local currency (which stim-
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3 See Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Allsop, McKibbin, and Vines (1999).
4 McKibbin (1994) gives a summary of the ªscal consolidation requirements in the 1990s in
the OECD during a period of low growth.
5 The asymmetry between U.S. and European ªscal positions during the 1980s is explored in
McKibbin and Sachs (1991).
ulates net exports). They point out, however, that if foreign economies act to cut
their own savings rates and, therefore, raise world interest rates, or act to depreciate
their currencies so as to neutralize the depreciation of the local currency, then two
of the important stimulative channels of the ªscal consolidation will be offset.
Global policy coordination can, therefore, be crucial to gain maximum effect from
ªscal consolidation.
Fast forward to today’s circumstances and it is clear that there is once again a need
for ªscal consolidation. As noted in the IMF’s May 2010 Fiscal Monitor, ªscal bal-
ances in the advanced economies are, on average, worsening despite some improve-
ment in the global economy.6 The former IMF chief writes, “it is now urgent to start
putting in place measures to ensure that the increase in deªcits and debts resulting
from the crisis, mostly from the loss of output and revenues, does not lead to ªscal
sustainability problems.”7 The countries either consolidating or debating ªscal aus-
terity are the most indebted, including many of the more advanced economies.
There are a few OECD economies (discussed later) with ªscal deªcits and public
debt levels that are not a cause for concern. But the overriding generalization is that
developing countries are in far better shape with respect to public deªcits than most
advanced economies. This point is illustrated in Figure 3. Whereas gross debt ratios
in G-20 advanced economies are expected to worsen to 2015, approaching 120 per-
cent of GDP on average, those of emerging and low income economies are much
lower and expected to be around one-third that of advanced economies by 2015.
The ªscal consolidation called for by the IMF is partly an advanced/developing
world debate because, in general, developing countries are in better shape than
most major advanced economies. Because of different starting positions, the ªscal
consolidation effort differs across the world. And so a question is posed: what is the
effect of a global ªscal consolidation where the effort is in proportion to the initial
imbalance (implying asymmetric adjustment)?
The question is an interesting one because there are two related aspects. One relates
to direct trade linkages because a substantial share of the developing world’s ex-
ports ends up in advanced economies. The second aspect is that the ªscal deªcits of
many of the advanced economies (like the United States) are ªnanced by capital
outºows from developing countries (like China and South Asia). These capital ºows
stem from differences in savings and investment balances between economies,
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6 IMF (2010, 7).
7 Dominique Strauss-Kahn, quoted in IMF (2010, 6).
which are affected by real interest rates that are in turn affected by, among other
things, the stance of ªscal policy.
As highly indebted economies reduce ªscal deªcits and their borrowing require-
ments from the net savers in the world, how will exports be affected, and where will
the surplus savings go? These questions are addressed in this paper. Note that al-
though trade and ªnancial effects are linked, it could be that the main ªnancier of
global public debt (namely, China) to the major borrower (namely, the United States)
loses its appetite to continue lending on the same basis as before. An implicit as-
sumption in the simulations in this paper is that this appetite remains the same.8
The framework we use to analyze the effects of ªscal consolidation empirically is
the G-Cubed multi-country model. This is a large-scale multi-sectoral dynamic sto-
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8 In a separate paper, McKibbin and Stoeckel (2011) relax this assumption and China changes
its risk appetite for continued lending to the United States.
Figure 3. General government gross debt ratios (percent of GDP, 2009 PPP–GDP weighted
average)
Source: IMF (2010) based on staff estimates from the April 2010 WEO projections.
chastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, with rigidities and inertia calibrated to
the observed economic dynamics. This global framework, and the country and sec-
toral composition, are described next. Following that, we outline exactly what has
been simulated with the model. In particular, we describe the two ªscal consolida-
tion paths chosen—one fast (over 10 years) and one slow (over 15 years)—for each
economy in proportion to the departure from a “workable” level of debt to GDP of
60 percent. But ªrst, to understand the results when so many changes are made
across the globe, two initial simulations are run where (1) the United States alone
consolidates ªscally but no one else does and (2) everyone else consolidates but the
United States does not. This initial analysis makes the usual assumption that coun-
try risk premia are unaffected by the policy adjustment. To explore the critical ques-
tion of the role of risk premia in changing the standard results for ªscal policy
adjustment we include a ªfth scenario where risk premia fall in response to the
ªscal consolidation. This is reasonable because the urgency of ªscal consolidation is
based on the sustainability of the run-up in debt and rising perceptions of risk in
ªnancial markets.
3. The model
The G-Cubed model is an intertemporal general equilibrium model of the world
economy. The theoretical structure is outlined in McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1999).9 It
builds on the model of McKibbin and Sachs (1991) and Jorgenson and Wilcoxen
(1990). A number of studies (summarized in McKibbin and Vines [2000]) show that
the G-Cubed modeling approach has been useful in assessing a range of issues
across a number of countries since the mid 1980s.10 Some of the principal features of
the model are as follows.
The model is based on explicit intertemporal optimization by the agents (consumers
and ªrms) in each economy.11 In contrast to static computable general equilibrium
(CGE) models, time and dynamics are of fundamental importance in the G-Cubed
model. The G-Cubed model is known as a DSGE model in the macroeconomics
literature and as a Dynamic Intertemporal General Equilibrium model in the CGE
literature. The main difference to small-scale DSGE models now popular at central
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9 Full details of the model including a list of equations and parameters can be found online at
www.gcubed.com.
10 These issues include: Reaganomics in the 1980s; German uniªcation in the early 1990s; ªscal
consolidation in Europe in the mid 1990s; the formation of NAFTA; the 1997–98 Asian
ªnancial crisis; and the productivity boom in the United States.
11 See Blanchard and Fischer (1989) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).
banks is the large amount of sectoral disaggregation and considerable degree of
country disaggregation.
To track the macro time series, the behavior of agents is modiªed to allow for short-
run deviations from optimal behavior either due to myopia or to restrictions on the
ability of households and ªrms to borrow at the risk-free bond rate on government
debt. For both households and ªrms, deviations from intertemporal optimizing be-
havior take the form of rules-of-thumb, which are consistent with an optimizing
agent that does not update predictions based on new information about future
events. These rules-of-thumb are chosen to generate the same steady state behavior
as optimizing agents so that, in the long run, there is only a single intertemporal op-
timizing equilibrium of the model. In the short run, actual behavior is assumed to be
a weighted average of the optimizing and rule-of-thumb assumptions. Thus, aggre-
gate consumption is a weighted average of consumption based on wealth (current
asset valuation and expected future after-tax labor income) and consumption based
on current disposable income. Similarly, aggregate investment is a weighted average
of investment based on Tobin’s Q (a market valuation of the expected future change
in the marginal product of capital relative to the cost) and investment based on a
backward looking version of Q. In the model software, it is possible to change the
information set of forward-looking agents after a scenario begins to unfold.
There is an explicit treatment of the holding of ªnancial assets, including money.
Money is introduced into the model through a restriction that households require
money to purchase goods.
The model also allows for short-run nominal wage rigidity (by different degrees in
different countries) and, therefore, allows for signiªcant periods of unemployment
depending on the labor market institutions in each country. This assumption, when
taken together with the explicit role for money, is what gives the model its macro-
economic characteristics. (Here again the model’s assumptions differ from the stan-
dard market clearing assumption in most CGE models.) Equilibrium between aggre-
gate demand and aggregate output is maintained by ºexible prices, which cause
demand to adjust as well as short-term supply.
Global accounting identities are imposed on the model so, for example, for every
borrower there is a lender—thereby avoiding the fallacy of composition. Likewise,
the model gives a careful treatment of stock-ºow relations such as the accumulation
of current account deªcits into foreign claims on domestic output, which has to be
serviced by future trade surpluses. On the ªscal side, which is the focus of this
study, the accumulation of ªscal deªcits into government debt has to be serviced
from future revenues—though it does not have to be completely paid off.
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The model distinguishes between the stickiness of physical capital within sectors
and within countries and the ºexibility of ªnancial capital, which immediately
ºows to where expected returns are highest. This important distinction leads to a
critical difference between the quantity of physical capital that is available at any
time to produce goods and services, and the valuation of that capital as a result of
decisions about the allocation of ªnancial capital.
As a result of this structure, the G-Cubed model contains rich dynamic behavior,
driven on the one hand by asset accumulation and, on the other, by wage adjust-
ment to a neoclassical steady state. It embodies a wide range of assumptions about
individual behavior and empirical regularities in a general equilibrium framework.
The interdependencies are explained using a computer algorithm that solves for the
rational expectations equilibrium of the global economy. It is important to stress that
the term “general equilibrium” is used to signify that as many interactions as possi-
ble are captured, not that all economies are in a full market clearing equilibrium at
each point in time. Although it is assumed that market forces eventually drive the
world economy to neoclassical steady-state growth equilibrium, unemployment
does emerge for long periods due to wage stickiness, to an extent that differs be-
tween countries due to differences in labor market institutions.
In the version of the model used here (version 95V) there are six sectors (energy,
mining, agriculture, manufacturing durables, manufacturing non-durables, and
services) as well as a generic capital-producing sector in each country. There are
17 countries/regions as shown in Table 1.
4. The extent of ªscal consolidation
There is no speciªc number that indicates that a country’s debt is too high. Indeed,
the debt is not the issue. Rather, the issue is the quality of expenditure or tax reduc-
tions that the debt has enabled. Nonetheless, a ªgure of 60 percent debt to GDP is
generally taken to be a reasonable measure based on the following logic. A decade
ago, gross debt-to-GDP ratios were slightly above 60 percent (see Figure 4 in the fol-
lowing section). This is the generally accepted number for “reasonable stability.” It
was, for example, one of the Maastricht criteria for EU members to enter the
Eurozone. The important thing is to bring the primary ªscal balance (the total gov-
ernment deªcit less interest payments on debt) into surplus to service the debt.12 So,
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12 For stable debt dynamics, the present value of the primary budget surplus (not necessarily a
surplus in each and every period) must equal the initial stock of debt to be serviced. That is,
a government with a large initial debt burden will have to run larger primary surpluses in
for advanced economies, average debt-to-GDP ratios have to fall from around
100 percent to 60 percent. For emerging economies, debt levels are on average less
than 40 percent, with only India as one of the large standout economies, with a ratio
of 75 percent. The IMF takes 40 percent debt/GDP as a reasonable target for emerg-
ing economies.
The IMF (Fiscal Monitor, November 2010)13 has calculated the reduction in the cycli-
cally adjusted primary balance to bring gross debt-to-GDP down to 60 percent for
advanced economies and 40 percent for emerging economies over 10 years. These
are the starting consolidation numbers used here, except for the following. For those
economies with debt-to-GDP ratios already less than 60 percent, the assumption the
IMF makes is to stabilize debt at expected end-2012 levels, but this implies a sig-
niªcant contraction by Australia, which has the lowest debt-to-GDP ratios of the ad-
vanced economies. For others (for example, Korea), the implication is for negative
consolidation—that is, stimulus. So the change in the ªscal positions of Australia
and Korea has been assumed at zero. Additionally, note the IMF’s assumption for
Japan, which is to consolidate to 80 percent debt-to-GDP, partly reºecting the fact
that virtually all borrowings are made from domestic residents.
The assumed 10-year consolidations are set out in Table 2 (for consolidation over
15 years, the annual consolidation is proportionally adjusted).
5. Three scenarios of ªscal consolidation
5.1 Scenario 1: A cut in ªscal deªcits, rapid versus gradual
The ªrst scenario focuses on the question: does it make much difference how fast
countries cut their deªcits? Because expectations play such an important role in the
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the future than one with smaller initial debt. These debt dynamic conditions are fully built
into the G-Cubed model used here.
13 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2010/fm1002.pdf.
Table 1. Countries/regions included in the G-Cubed model
United States China
Japan India
United Kingdom Indonesia
Germany Other Asia
Rest of Eurozone Latin America
Canada Other developing countries
Australia Eastern Europe & former Soviet Union
Korea Oil-exporting & Middle East
Rest of OECD
model, cutting deªcits over 10 years is compared to cutting deªcits over 15 years to
reach the same end point described earlier, which was mostly 60 percent debt-to-
GDP ratio for advanced economies.
The results are shown in Figures 4 and 5. All results are expressed as a percent devi-
ation from a baseline of the model. In other words, the results are a comparison rela-
tive to a baseline (that is not shown). A zero therefore implies that the variable is un-
changed from the baseline. The baseline assumes that the primary debt-to-GDP ratio
in 2010 is continued forever with a lump sum tax gradually rising to cover all addi-
tional costs of servicing the resulting government debt. The baseline also makes a
wide range of assumptions about future population growth by country and produc-
tivity growth by country and sector as well as a wide range of other assumptions set
out in detail in McKibbin, Pearce, and Stegman (2009).
The ªrst thing to note about the results is that when countries such as the United
States, Japan, and the Rest of Eurozone make large cuts to government deªcits, they
have signiªcant contractions in their economies relative to the baseline. But for
those economies where the required deªcit reduction is smaller, such as Germany,
China, and Other Asia, there is an expansion of real GDP above baseline (see Fig-
ure 4). This contraction and expansion lasts for most of the next decade. Whereas
the United States and Japan contract by around 3 percent of real GDP below base-
line in 2014 under a 10-year ªscal consolidation, Germany and China expand by
over 3 percent of real GDP above baseline by 2020.
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Table 2. Assumed 10-year ªscal consolidation
Country/regional grouping
Gross debt-to-GDP ratio
(%)
Fiscal consolidation in primary
balance 2010 to 2020
(% of GDP)
United States 92.7 11.6
Japan 225.8 13.0
United Kingdom 76.7 8.8
Germany 75.3 3.0
Rest of Eurozone 95.0 9.0
Canada 81.7 5.5
Australia 21.9 0.0
Korea 32.1 0.0
Rest of OECD 44.5 0.0
China 19.1 3.0
India 75.1 7.0
Indonesia 26.7 0.0
Other Asia 30.0 0.0
Latin America 51.5 0.4
Other developing countries 30.0 3.0
Eastern Europe & former Soviet Union 52.0 4.5
Oil-exporting & Middle East 12.9 3.5
Average advanced (PPP base) 97.3 8.9
Average emerging (PPP base) 37.4 3.0
Source: IMF (2010), Fiscal Monitor, November; and authors’ calculations.
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Figure 4. Real GDP changes from 10-year and 15-year ªscal consolidations (deviations from
baseline)
Source: Simulations with G-Cubed (version 95V) model.
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Figure 5. Economic effects from 10-year and 15-year ªscal consolidations
Source: Simulations with G-Cubed (version 95V) model.
The reason for the contraction and expansion difference is what happens to savings,
investment, and capital ºows. Some of the main effects are shown in Figure 5. The
large drop in government spending leads to a fall in GDP as government spending
is removed from the economy. The current and expected decline in real GDP in the
United States means it is less attractive to investors until after the economic contrac-
tion has been sustained, and eventually private investment is above baseline as pri-
vate spending is eventually crowded-in. The government is borrowing less and,
with consumption changing little initially, there is an excess of savings over invest-
ment. Hence, there must be a capital outºow (or much less inºow compared with
the baseline) and, for this to occur, the U.S. dollar must depreciate—that is, the euro
(and many other currencies) must appreciate (shown in the right panel of Figure 5
as the German/U.S. dollar exchange rate). The extra capital inºows into countries
like Germany and China causes investment in those economies to rise above base-
line and is most signiªcant for Germany (see middle and bottom right panels of
Figure 5). Meanwhile, the large depreciation of the U.S. dollar causes a spike in
inºation in 2011 (middle left panel of Figure 5), which has to be addressed with
monetary policy so nominal interest rates also spike in 2011 (bottom panel).
Now compare the difference between the 10-year ªscal consolidation and 15-year
consolidations shown in Figures 4 and 5. Because expectations play such an impor-
tant role in the model, and the presumption is that agents know and believe in the
credibility of the programs, there is little material difference between cutting deªcits
over 15 years as opposed to 10 years. One key difference is that GDP is slightly
higher in the ªrst year in the case where the cuts are quicker. This is due to a more
rapid decline in the ªnancing requirements of the government being brought for-
ward through asset markets. This ªrst-year positive effect on GDP is quickly re-
versed over time and the fall in GDP is larger as the cuts are deeper. The switching
effect of gradual credible future ªscal consolidation is a familiar result from this
model.14 The slower ªscal consolidation has lower real costs of adjustment over time
as the fall in real GDP mid-way through the adjustment is smaller. Looking at Fig-
ure 4, which shows just some of the results, the fall in real GDP in the United States
in, say, 2014 is 3 percent below baseline under the 10-year consolidation, but the de-
cline is nearly 2.5 percent that same year when the cuts are spread out over a longer
period. For other countries, commonly the difference between the two scenarios is
more likely to be on the order of 0.5 percent of GDP.
Because there is little difference in countries making the most consolidation, there is
little ºow-on difference to those countries making less or no ªscal policy adjust-
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14 See McKibbin and Sachs (1991) and McKibbin and Bagnoli (1993).
ment. As before, Germany, China, and Other Asia stood (among others) to gain as
the United States, Japan, and others consolidated their ªscal positions. But, under
the 15-year consolidation path, the smaller outºow of capital from countries with
large ªscal adjustments means less inºow to those countries with small or no adjust-
ments and so they gain less.
The message is that the small material difference between fast or slow ªscal consoli-
dation means those having to make major consolidations to their ªscal positions
will probably choose the slower adjustment path because the initial to mid-way
costs are lower. An important proviso here is that the consolidations are seen to be
credible as that alters expectations. There is also the issue of perception by the mar-
ket about the risk premiums to put on loans to governments with high debt. This
point is discussed next.
5.2 Scenario 2: The cut in ªscal deªcits is associated with a reduction in risk
premia
The primary reason governments need to cut ªscal deªcits and reduce debt is that
ªnancial markets start to doubt the sustainability of government ªscal policy. Finan-
cial markets start to price in a risk factor to allow for the possibility of default on
government debt. Hence, it can be reasonably assumed that successful ªscal consoli-
dation would see risk premia fall.
On this basis, here we conduct a simulation where risk premia fall in response to
cutting debt levels. Except for the United States, which is a special case as noted pre-
viously, the cut in risk premia will be in proportion to the level of debt reduction as
a share of GDP. The amount of risk reduction for reducing debt could be expected to
be a non-linear relationship; for high levels of debt the risk of default could be ex-
pected to be proportionally much higher than for lower levels of debt. Some re-
search shows the marginal extra risk premium for countries with net debt-to-GDP
ratios in the 60 percent to 70 percent bracket is an extra eight basis points,15 but the
marginal extra risk premium for ratios in the 90 percent to 100 percent debt-to-GDP
bracket is over 13 basis points. Using this relationship gives the reduction in risk
premia as outlined in Table 3.
When countries consolidate their ªscal accounts, bring debt down to a more man-
ageable 60 percent of GDP, and enjoy a reduction in risk, they do better. Those
where the reduction in risk is greatest now do relatively better. The cost of capital
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15 http://www.westpac.co.nz/olcontent/olcontent.nsf/content/FM_Occasional_Paper
_20020902/$FILE/The%20GIRM%20Occasional%20Paper.pdf.
for these economies is relatively lower and they can borrow on more favorable
terms. Investment ºows to these economies, but the money has to come from some-
where so funds ºow from those economies with little or no reduction in risk to those
with relatively more risk reduction. That means countries not enjoying the reduction
in risk premia, such as the United States, do not do as well.
Whereas under a 10-year global ªscal consolidation by all countries needing to con-
solidate led to a reduction in U.S. real GDP of around 3 percent below baseline from
2013 to 2015, when there is an accompanying reduction in risk as set out in Table 3
the fall in U.S. real GDP is now around 5 percent below baseline (Figure 6). And, in
the Rest of Eurozone where debt problems are most severe, their real GDP could be
8 percent above baseline in 2011 and taper to around 5 percent above the baseline by
2020. The Rest of Eurozone beneªts from extra investment, which could initially be
30 percent above what it would otherwise be (Figure 6). This extra investment has
come at the expense of less investment in the United States (among others not enjoy-
ing the same reduction in risk premia).
5.3 Scenario 3: The world consolidates, but the United States does not
The purpose of this simulation is to show what happens when the world’s highly
indebted countries are “forced” to consolidate their ªscal accounts, but the United
States stands apart. This is a realistic possibility because of the already mentioned
special position that the United States enjoys in world ªnancial markets: it is the re-
serve currency; it can borrow abroad in its own currency; it is the world’s richest,
most open capital market; and it collects seigniorage from the enormous volume of
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Table 3. Assumed reduction in risk premia with ªscal consolidation
Reduction in risk premia
Country/regional grouping Basis points
United States 0
Japan 50
United Kingdom 118
Germany 87
Rest of Eurozone 350
Canada 100
Australia 0
Korea 0
Rest of OECD 0
China 0
India 150
Indonesia 0
Other Asia 0
Latin America 50
Other developing countries 100
Eastern Europe & former Soviet Union 100
Oil-exporting & Middle East 0
its currency circulating in the world. For these reasons, the United States can “get
away with” running ªscal deªcits for longer than other countries. By contrast,
sentiment can easily turn against smaller countries dependent on borrowing abroad
to balance their books and so therefore they can have a ªscal consolidation “forced”
on them.
141 Asian Economic Papers
Global Fiscal Consolidation
Figure 6. Ten-year ªscal consolidation with reduction in risk
Source: Simulations with G-Cubed (version 95V) model.
When the world acts to consolidate, but the United States does not, the United
States does well. Recall from Scenario 1, where the United States undertook a large
ªscal consolidation, that there was a strong capital outºow for the United States and
other countries undertaking large consolidations. Those countries did poorly com-
pared to the recipients of the capital outºow. Now the rest of world borrows less
and that leaves more capital for the United States to continue to borrow more and
invest. Figure 7 shows that U.S. investment could be 20 percent above baseline in
2013 and 2014 before tapering back to baseline.
When the United States does not consolidate there is no outºow of capital, which
means there is no need for currency depreciation. Indeed, the opposite is true. Be-
fore, when the United States was a large consolidator, the euro appreciated (a U.S.
depreciation), but now it is the euro that depreciates. The depreciation is around
20 percent below baseline (see German/U.S. dollar exchange rate in the top right
panel of Figure 7).
Extra investment by the United States means there is extra production and real GDP
could be 2 percent to 3 percent above baseline for the decade (middle left panel Fig-
ure 7). If the United States does not share the extra burden, however, someone else
does. One country hit hard by the possible non-participation of the United Sates in a
global ªscal consolidation is Japan. The drop in Japanese investment could be over
30 percent below baseline in 2013 and 2014 (middle right panel of Figure 7). China
still gains extra investment because it does not have to consolidate its ªscal position,
but the gain is now far less as shown on the bottom right panel of Figure 7.
Finally, because there is no large depreciation of U.S. currency (indeed, the opposite
happens) there is no longer a spike in inºation (third bottom left panel of Figure 7)
and therefore no need for monetary policy to tighten. Also, U.S. trade imbalances
rise even further.16 When the United States was cutting ªscal deªcits, the U.S. cur-
rent account deªcit was improving substantially. When the United States takes no
action, but much of the rest of the world undertakes ªscal consolidation, the U.S.
current account deªcits rise and Japanese and European current surpluses rise. This
substantial worsening in global trade imbalances would likely lead to signiªcant
pressures on the U.S. Congress to act to raise tariffs against cheap imports and could
be destructive.
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16 See Lee, McKibbin, and Park (2006) for an anatomy of global imbalances using an earlier
vintage of the model used in this paper.
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Figure 7. The world consolidates but the United States does not (deviations from baseline)
Source: Simulations with G-Cubed (version 95V) model.
6. Summary and conclusion
Fiscal consolidation by high-income economies (in proportion to the size of their
debt problem) has the temporary effect of lowering economic activity in those econ-
omies, but has a positive effect on developing countries and a few high-income
economies not undertaking ªscal consolidation.
The reason is that the negative ºow-on effects from trade linkages by high-income
economies reducing imports and stimulating exports with the developing world are
offset by favorable ªnancial ºow-on effects, which provide capital for developing
countries to increase GDP.
As prospects temporarily weaken in high-income economies because spending con-
tracts with ªscal consolidation and governments borrow less, real long-bond rates
eventually fall although short real interest rates temporarily rise as future spending
is brought into the present and central banks tighten monetary policy in response to
higher inºation. Lower real long-bond rates boost investment prospects in the de-
veloping world and this positive effect outweighs the negative direct trade effects.
Consequently, there is capital outºow from high-income economies to the develop-
ing world. Developing countries receiving a capital inºow experience a decline in
their trade balance, with the effect that global trade imbalances become smaller.
It makes little difference for developing countries whether the ªscal consolidation
by high-income economies is fast (over 10 years) or slow (15 years). What matters
for investment in developing countries is the long-term real rate of interest and this
is affected by expectations over future debt-to-GDP ratios. Implicit in this conclu-
sion is that the credibility of both the slow and fast consolidations is the same. There
are competing forces here: a slow consolidation involves lower annual adjustment
costs (more credible), but runs the greater risk of being derailed by a public tiring of
austerity (less credible).
The important story from ªscal consolidation as modeled in this paper is the large
scale and asymmetry in the required adjustment and the large impacts this has, not
only within adjusting economies, but between the economies that are adjusting
(mostly industrialized economies) and developing economies. The linkages through
trade balance and exchange rate adjustment are large. The management of this will
be a key problem for policymakers over the coming decade.
A coordinated ªscal consolidation in the industrial world that is not accompanied
by U.S. actions leads to a substantial worsening of trade imbalances globally as the
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release of capital in ªscally contracting economies ºows into the U.S. economy, ap-
preciates the U.S. dollar, and worsens the current position of the United States. The
scale of this change is likely to be sufªcient to substantially increase the probability
of a trade war between the United States and other economies. To avoid this out-
come, a coordinated ªscal adjustment appears to be in the interest of the global
economy.
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